Journal of Military History
Vol. 76, No. 3
July 2012


Jochen S. Arndt, “The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division,” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 649-671.
Combined-arms combat divisions emerged fully during the French Revolutionary Wars in the late 1700s. This paper explores how U.S. General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City campaign (9 March–14 September 1847) contributed to this military innovation’s transatlantic diffusion. It argues that Scott organized the Army of Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined-arms divisions, enabling him to replicate the Napoleonic era’s aggressive operational tactics. In this way, Scott nullified the Mexican forces’ numerical superiority, overcame their fortified defensive positions, and gradually annihilated them, strengthening his claim to be the “Napoleon of the West” and demonstrating that combined-arms divisions were appropriate for the American way of war.
David R. Stone, “Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism,” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 673-693.
Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin is often misperceived as an advocate of strategies of attrition over destruction or annihilation. In fact, Svechin was an historicist, who saw the precise balance between attrition and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as a result of changing material circumstances. A close examination of his theoretical and historical works reveals the depth of his thinking, while his response to Russia’s 1916 Brusilov Offensive shows his support for ambitious strategies of annihilation under the proper circumstances.
Andrea Ungari, “The Official Inquiry into the Italian Defeat at the Battle of Caporetto (October 1917),” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 695-726.
The battle of Caporetto in October-November 1917, one of the most catastrophic defeats administered to any army during the First World War, continues to stir lively debate nearly one hundred years later. While analysts then and for some time after blamed the debacle on soldier defeatism, historians today find the reasons in the Italian Army’s tactical, logistical, and strategic shortcomings. Perhaps the most intriguing question before historians of the event today is why the general officer most responsible for the catastrophe not only managed to evade being charged for his failures but instead ended up as the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. That is the subject of this article.
Peter Ewer, “The British Campaign in Greece 1941: Assumptions about the Operational Art and Their Influence on Strategy,” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 727-745.
This article looks afresh at the decision by Britain to despatch an expeditionary force to Greece in 1941 to oppose the much-anticipated decision by Hitler, to end by German invasion the inept Italian campaign against Athens. The existing work on this topic emphasises the geo-political motives behind the campaign, especially Churchill’s need to impress American public opinion by going to the aid of the Greeks, often with an assumption that British military leaders committed themselves to the venture against their better judgement. What these accounts overlook is what British planners thought was operationally possible. This article is based on new archival research, which indicates that key British leaders, throughout the chain of command, thought Greek topography would prevent the Wehrmacht from repeating the success of armoured warfare achieved by the Germans in France. In considering this material, the article sheds new light on the failure of British military leaders to fully understand the possibilities of armoured warfare, and thus adds to our understanding of the doctrinal reasons for poor British battlefield performance in the 1940-42 period more generally.
Craig Stockings and Eleanor Hancock, “Reconsidering the Luftwaffe in Greece, 1941,” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 747-773.
Despite the importance of the German invasion of Greece in 1941, relatively little research has been conducted into the campaign’s operational aspects, and a number of misunderstandings or misinterpretations have developed. One of the most powerful misconceptions was that the huge disparity in airpower, particularly dive-bombers, made it impossible for British and Dominion troops to hold the German advance. This article demonstrates, however, that despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the Luftwaffe did not have the decisive role in the campaign that has so often been ascribed to it.
Nicholas Dujmovińá, “Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of CIA’s Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War,” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 775-808.
This paper describes the origins of the covert paramilitary function in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the challenges to the effectiveness of paramilitary operations during the Cold War’s first decade. This capability did not develop by design or initiative on the Agency’s part but was assigned to it. The thirty-month gap between the dissolution of CIA’s wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, and the assignment of the paramilitary function to CIA in mid-1948, as well as other self-inflicted causes, may help explain why CIA’s paramilitary activities in the 1950s never were as effective as policy makers and Agency operations officers expected.
Edwin A. Martini, “Incinerating Agent Orange: Operations Pacer HO, Pacer IVY, and the Rise of Environmentalist Thinking,” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 809-836.
Most studies of the herbicide Agent Orange focus on its use in the Vietnam War or its long-term consequences. Lost is the story of the 2.4 million gallons of Agent Orange still in the U.S. military’s possession after its use was banned in 1971. The U.S. Air Force addressed this surplus supply during Operations Pacer IVY and Pacer HO, navigating challenges ranging from the growing environmental movement to new government bureaucracies devoted to environmental protection. This essay seeks to help fill a gap in Agent Orange scholarship and add to the literature on the intersections of military and environmental history.

Peter Paret, “Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy,” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 837-845.
This essay discusses the function of historical study in the development of Clausewitz’s theories, as well as compares Clausewitz and Schlieffen in their interpretations of the wars of Frederick the Great, which mark and characterize three phases in the history of grand strategy.
Review Essay:

Bruce Vandervort, “When the French Colonial Mind Turns to Thoughts of War,” The Journal of Military History 76 #3 (July 2012): 847-851.
The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967, by David French, reviewed by Matthew Hughes and by Ian Roxborough, 853-857

Warfare in Woods and Forests, by Anthony Clayton, reviewed by Eugene R. H. Tesdahl, 857-858

The First Crusade: The Call from the East, by Peter Frankopan, reviewed by Conor Kostick, 858-859

Absolute Monarchs: A History of the Papacy, by John Julius Norwich, reviewed by Frank J. Coppa, 860-861

Medieval Military Technology, by Kelly R. DeVries and Robert Douglas Smith, reviewed by Harald Kleinschmidt, 861-862

Dictionary of British Naval Battles, by John D. Grainger, reviewed by Sam Willis, 862-864

Liberal Epic: The Victorian Practice of History from Gibbon to Churchill, by Edward Adams, reviewed by Bruce Collins, 864-865

The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendency: Resources, Logistics and the State, 1755-1815, by Roger Morriss, reviewed by John B. Hattendorf, 865-867

With Musket and Tomahawk: The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777, vol. I, by Michael O. Logusz, reviewed by Frank Kalesnik, 867-868

Relieve Us of This Burthen: American Prisoners of War in the Revolutionary South, 1780-1782, by Carl P. Borick, reviewed by Glenn Robins, 868-869

The Slaves who Defeated Napoleon: Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian War of Independence, 1801-1804, by Philippe Girard, reviewed by Dale Lothrop Clifford, 869-871

Public Health and the U.S. Military: A History of the Army Medical Department, 1818-1917, by Bobby A. Wintermute, reviewed by Anthony E. Carlson, 871-873

A Civil Society Deferred: The Tertiary Grip of Violence in the Sudan, by Abdullahi A. Gallab, reviewed by William Berridge, 873-874

Harry Smith’s Last Throw: The Eighth Frontier War 1850-1853, by Keith Smith, reviewed by Tim Stapleton, 874-875

Victors in Blue: How Union Generals Fought the Confederates, Battled Each Other, and Won the Civil War, by Albert Castel with Brooks D. Simpson, reviewed by Jonathan T. Engel, 876-877

Routes of War: The World of Movement in the Confederate South, by Yael A. Sternhell, reviewed by George C. Rable, 877-878

War No More: The Antiwar Impulse in American Literature, 1861-1914, by Cynthia Wachtell, reviewed by David Rachels, 878-879

From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches 1874-1886, by Edwin R. Sweeney, reviewed by Justin D. Murphy, 880-881

After Custer: Loss and Transformation in Sioux Country, by Paul L. Hedren, reviewed by Anthony R. McGinnis, 881-882

Entre la vieille Europe et la seule France; Charles Maurras, la politique extérieure et la défense nationale, edited by Georges Henri Soutou and Martin Motte, reviewed by Chalmers Hood, 882-884

The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire, by Raymond Jonas, reviewed by Nicola Labanca, 884-886

A Knight in Politics: A Biography of Sir Frederick Borden, by Carman Miller, reviewed by Stephen J. Harris, 886-887

Arc of Empire: America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam, by Michael H. Hunt & Steven Levine, reviewed by Ronald Spector, 887-889

Roberts & Kitchener in South Africa, 1900-1902, by Rodney Atwood, reviewed by Stephen M. Miller, 889-890

Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I, by Dirk Bönker, reviewed by Alan M. Anderson, 891-892

American Leader in War and Peace: The Life and Times of WW 1 Soldier, Army Chief of Staff and Citadel President General Charles P. Summerall, by W. Gary Nichols, reviewed by Edward M. Coffman, 892-894

Ambushes and Armour: The Irish Rebellion 1919-1921, by W. H. Kautt, reviewed by Eunan O’Halpin, 894-896

The Trial of Civilians by Military Courts: Ireland 1921, by Seán Enright, reviewed by Michael Noone, 896-897

Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honor of Dennis Showalter, edited by Michael S. Neiberg, reviewed by Richard M. Swain, 898-899

Five Down No Glory: Frank G. Tinker, Mercenary Ace in the Spanish Civil War, by Richard K. Smith and R. Cargill Hall, reviewed by Shannon E. Fleming, 899-900

Baldwin of the Times: Hanson W. Baldwin, a Military Journalist’s Life, 1903-1991, by Robert B. Davies, reviewed by Robert Bateman, 900-901

Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government, by James T. Sparrow, reviewed by Ethan S. Rafuse, 901-902

Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare, by Ben Shepherd, reviewed by Philip W. Blood, 903-904

Joe Rochefort’s War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway, by Elliot Carlson, reviewed by Roger Dingman, 904-905

Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization, edited by Alex J. Kay, Jeff Rutherford, and David Stahel, reviewed by Jonathan M. House, 906-907

The Battle of the Tanks: Kursk, 1943, by Lloyd Clark, reviewed by Ray Limbach, 907-908

Triquet’s Cross: A Study in Military Heroism, by John MacFarlane, reviewed by Robert H. Berlin, 908-910

General Lewis B. Hershey and Conscientious Objection during World War II, by Nicholas A. Krehbiel, reviewed by Robert L. Goldich, 910-911

The Battle for Tinian: Vital Stepping Stone in America’s War against Japan, by Nathan N. Prefer, reviewed by Harold J. Goldberg, 911-913

Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe, by Steven D. Mercatante, reviewed by David Stahel, 913-914

The German Aces Speak: World War II Through the Eyes of Four of the Luftwaffe’s Most Important Commanders, by Colin Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis, reviewed by Richard R. Muller, 914-916

The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944-1945, by Ian Kershaw, reviewed by Hal Elliott Wert, 916-917

Do Unto Others: Counter Bombardment in Australia’s Military Campaigns, by Alan H. Smith, reviewed by D. M. Giangreco, 917-919

The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan, by Wilson D. Miscamble, reviewed by Ralph Hitchens, 919-921

The Marshall Mission To China, 1945-1947: The Letters and Diary of Colonel John Hart Caughey, edited by Roger B. Jeans, reviewed by Katherine K. Reist, 921-922

The Mauthausen Trial: American Military Justice in Germany, by Tomaz Jardim, reviewed by Fred L. Borch, 922-925

Into the Breach at Pusan: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the Korean War, by Kenneth W. Estes, reviewed by Colin M. Colbourn, 925-927

Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, by Sarmila Bose, reviewed by John H. Gill, 927-929

The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives—Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism, by Clinton Fernandes, reviewed by Joseph Nevins, 929-930

Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980–1984, by Gail E. S. Yoshitani, reviewed by Paul Rubinson, 930-932

Corner of the Living: Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path Insurgency, by Miguel La Serna, reviewed by William Mitchell, 932-933

Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post-Unification Germany, by Andrew Bickford, reviewed by Jay Lockenour, 934-935

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