Journal of Military History
Vol. 75, No. 2
April 2011


In Memorium, The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 365-366.
The 2010 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History

Hew Strachan, “Clausewitz and the First World War,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 367-391.
English-language authors have blamed Clausewitz twice over for his part in the First World War. Liddell Hart attributed to him a doctrine of “absolute war,” embraced by European general staffs and emulated by the British. More recent scholars have seen the war as lacking a political rationale and so contradicting what is today the best-known of the nostrums of On War. But that was not the case before 1914, when Clausewitz’s text was interpreted in different but equally valid lights. This article analyses how On War was read by the principal belligerents both during the war and in its immediate aftermath.
David S. Bachrach, “Early Ottonian Warfare: The Perspective from Corvey,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 393-409.
Traditionally, scholarly works focusing on warfare in tenth-century Germany have depicted Ottonian armies as consisting of small bands of heavily armed, mounted warriors who raided their enemies in the hope of gaining plunder and glory. This model has been based on a selective reading of a small corpus of narrative texts, including Widukind of Corvey's Res gestae Saxonicae. This image of Ottonian warfare, however, is at odds not only with vast and growing corpus of information about tenth century fortifications that has been developed by archaeologists, but also with the discussions by the authors of contemporary narrative sources, including Widukind. Indeed, a careful reading of the Corvey monk's work as a whole makes clear that he depicts sieges conducted by large armies as the dominant form of warfare conducted by Henry I (919-936) and Otto I (936-973), the first two kings of the Ottonian dynasty.
Kevin J. Weddle, “‘The Fall of Satan’s Kingdom’: Civil-Military Relations and the Union Navy’s Attack on Charleston, April 1863,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 411-439.
During the American Civil War (1861–65) a crisis in civil-military relations culminated in the U.S. Navy’s disastrous April 1863 attack by an all-ironclad fleet on the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. This article examines the serious differences between Union Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and his assistant Gustavus Fox and sheds light on the relief of a senior military commander and on questionable decisions by key civilian leaders. While Welles and Fox—both highly competent administrators—do not emerge untarnished from this episode, Du Pont must take the lion’s share of the blame for the battle’s outcome.
Christopher Martin, “The Complexity of Strategy: ‘Jackie’ Fisher and the Trouble with Submarines,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 441-470.
By utilising original memoranda, letters, and notes, this article illustrates the destabilising effect that new technology can have on naval strategic thinking. Correspondence between Admiral Sir “Jackie” Fisher, the Unionist Prime Minister A. J. Balfour, the naval historian and strategist Julian Corbett, and others before the First World War (1914–18) demonstrates the confusion and uncertainty that the submarine’s development brought to the British naval establishment. It follows a year-long debate concerning the submarine’s impact on Britain and its traditional naval strategy. It shows what motivated the participants, why they held divergent views, and why “consensus” was reached by relying on established paradigms.
Robert T. Foley, “Learning War’s Lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme 1916,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 471-504.
At the beginning of July 1916, the British and French armies launched a massive offensive against the Germans along the Somme River. Surprised by both the intensity and ferocity of the Entente battle of material on the Somme, the German army was caught completely off guard and suffered high casualties, if not great loss of terrain. Over the course of the battle, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine. This article makes use of contemporary German “lessons-learned” reports to explore the development of these new defensive tactics and show that the lessons-learned system refined during the battle allowed the German army to stay intellectually flexible despite the overwhelming pressures of the battle.
Keith Neilson, “The Royal Navy, Japan, and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1932–1934,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 505-531.
British strategic foreign policy was in disarray between 1932 and 1934, when Japan was the major concern for British strategic planners. Japan’s challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations. British departments had differing views: the Treasury preferred improved Anglo-Japanese relations, the Admiralty wanted a fleet sufficiently large to deal with both Japan and Europe, and the Foreign Office rejected the Treasury’s position as naïve, preferring to work with the United States to check Japan as much as possible. The cut and thrust among the various departments underlined the matter’s complexity and the difficulty of deciding British policy at this juncture.
Jeff Reardon. “Breaking the U.S. Navy’s ‘Gun Club’ Mentality in the South Pacific,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 533-564.
In the 1920s and 1930s U.S. naval planners expected that a war against Japan would involve a grand, daylight fleet engagement that would be dominated by large caliber gunfire. When war broke out and American admirals found themselves fighting small-scale nighttime battles in the confined waters of the Solomon Sea in late 1942, they chose to employ their gun-oriented daytime tactics, resulting in numerous tactical defeats. Not until U.S. commanders learned to respect the power of the surface-launched torpedo—both as an offensive weapon and as a threat to be guarded against—would the U.S. Navy enjoy success in nighttime combat.
Danny Orbach, “Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 565-590.
The German opposition to Hitler, especially the armed resistance inside the Wehrmacht, always has been a subject of lively debate. Public and scholarly opinion especially has been divided over assessment of the “20 July 1944 Conspiracy,” the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler and the abortive coup d’état that followed. Some consider this attempted overthrow as the greatest moral achievement of the German resistance to Hitler, while others regard it mainly as an effort by opportunistic officers to save their own skins when Germany’s defeat was looming on the horizon. The following essay critically reexamines some of the newer, so-called “critical” historiography of the German resistance, written since the 1960s, which tends to question the motives and moral integrity of the 20 July 1944 conspirators. It will argue that much of this historiography suffers from erroneous reading of the sources, one-sided evaluations, moral condescension, and rhetorical manipulation.
Peter Paret, “Clausewitz: ‘Half against my will, I have become a Professor’,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 591-601.
Clausewitz’s lectures on the “Little War” during the Prussian reform era have been interpreted as preparations for military and popular insurrection. But they barely mention irregular warfare. Instead they discuss the methods the little war employs to protect close formations and increase their effectiveness. The lectures have the further purpose of supporting a main concern of the Prussian reform program, the replacement of the old linear system of infantry combat with a combination of close and open tactics. Although the lectures are one of Clausewitz’s few specifically didactic works, they are based on an effort to understand war as such, and include concepts and formulations that reappear in his major theoretical work. They are historically significant as a document of the Prussian reform program, as well as for their place in the development of Clausewitz’s theories.
Review Essay:
Aaron P. Jackson, “Expanding the Scope and Accessibility of Non-Western Military History,” The Journal of Military History 75 #2 (April 2011): 603-613.

ERRATA: 614-616

How to Win on the Battlefield: 25 Key Tactics to Outwit, Outflank, and Outfight the Enemy, by Rob Johnson, Michael Whitby, and John France, reviewed by Steven Fratt, 617-618

The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb, by Peter A. Lorge, reviewed by Jeremy Black, 618-619

Apollodorus Mechanicus, Siege-matters
(Πολιορκητικά), translated with introduction and commentary by David Whitehead, reviewed by Everett L. Wheeler, 619-621

Alfred’s Wars: Sources and Interpretations of Anglo-Saxon Warfare in the Viking Age
, by Ryan Lavelle, reviewed by John D. Hosler, 621-622

Warfare and State Building in Medieval Japan
, edited by John A. Ferejohn and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, reviewed by W. W. Farris, 622-623

Krieg in Amerika und Aufklärung in Hessen: Die Privatbriefe (1772-1784) an Georg Ernst von und zu Gilsa
, edited by Holger Theodor Gräf, Lena Haunert and Christoph Kampmann with the collaboration of Patrick Sturm, reviewed by Thomas M. Barker, 624-628

The Battle of Waterloo
, by Jeremy Black, reviewed by Michael V. Leggiere, 628-630

On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815
, by Carl von Clausewitz, translated and edited by Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran, and Gregory W. Pedlow; and On Wellington: A Critique of Waterloo, by Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Peter Hofschröer, reviewed by David T. Zabecki, 630-633

A Perfect Gibraltar: The Battle for Monterey, Mexico, 1846
, by Christopher D. Dishman, reviewed by Alexander Mendoza, 633-634

At the Precipice: Americans North and South during the Secession Crisis
, by Shearer Davis Bowman, reviewed by Andrew Diemer, 634-635

A German Hurrah: Civil War Letters of Friedrich Bertsch and Wilhelm Stängel, 9th Ohio Infantry
, translated and edited by Joseph R. Reinhart, reviewed by Walter D. Kamphoefner, 635-637

John Bell Hood and the Fight for Civil War Memory
, by Brian Craig Miller, reviewed by Susannah J. Ural, 637-638

From Battlefields Rising: How the Civil War Transformed American Literature
, by Randall Fuller, reviewed by David Rachels, 638-639

War and Sex: A Brief History of Men’s Urge for Battle
, by John V. H. Dippel, reviewed by Beth Bailey, 640-641

Italian National Identity in the Scramble for Africa: Italy’s African Wars in the Era of Nation-building, 1870-1900,
by Giuseppe Maria Finaldi, reviewed by Bruce Vandervort, 641-644

Heroes of Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa
, by Edward Berenson, reviewed by Leonard G. Shurtleff, 644-645

Swedes at War: Willing Warriors of a Neutral Nation, 1914-1945
, by Lars Gyllenhaal and Lennart Westberg, reviewed by Kenneth W. Estes, 646-647

Three Armies on the Somme: The First Battle of the Twentieth Century
, by William Philpott, reviewed by Holger H. Herwig, 647-649

Eden to Armageddon: World War I in the Middle East
, by Roger Ford, reviewed by Robin Higham, 649

The Brusilov Offensive
, by Timothy C. Dowling, reviewed by David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, 650-651

Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture
, edited and with an introduction by Pearl James, reviewed by Karen Petrone, 651-652

On the Battlefield of Memory: The First World War and American Remembrance, 1919-1941
, by Steven Trout, reviewed by Andrew Byers, 653-654

The Spanish Republic and Civil War
, by Julián Casanova, reviewed by Geoffrey Jensen, 654-655

Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954
, by Aaron W. Navarro, reviewed by Michael D. Gambone, 656-657

Warriors and Wizards: The Development and Defeat of Radio-Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich
, by Martin J. Bollinger, reviewed by Kathleen Broome Williams, 657-658

Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith
, by D. K. R. Crosswell, reviewed by Daun van Ee, 658-660

May 1940: The Battle for the Netherlands
, edited by Herman Amersfoort and Piet Kamphuis, reviewed by Hubert P. van Tuyll, 660-661

Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk, 10 July-10 September 1941
, Vol. 1, by David M. Glantz, reviewed by Roger Reese, 662

After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965
, by Matthew Jones, reviewed by Benjamin P. Greene, 662-664

Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947-1991
. U.S. Army in the Cold War series, by Robert P. Grathwol and Dinita M. Moorhus, reviewed by Adrian G. Traas, 664-665

Fragging: Why U.S. Soldiers Assaulted Their Officers in Vietnam
, by George Lepre, reviewed by Fred L. Borch , 666-668

Through Veterans’ Eyes: The Iraq and Afghanistan Experience
, by Larry Minear, reviewed by Mark D. Van Ells, 668-670

Stacks Image 366